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Abstract:
Despite two decades of extensive deregulation, banks in the United States remain among the most
heavily regulated entities in the U.S. economy.  Partly, banks remain a prominent target for
American populism and its political manifestations; but also important is the general recognition
that one specific category of bank regulation -- safety-and-soundness (prudential) regulation -- is a
crucial element in preserving the stability of the banking system and contributing to the health of
the U.S. economy.  This paper expands on that theme and discusses the important lessons and
insights that can be gained from the experiences of the banking sector and of safety-and-soundness
regulation during the past two decades.
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I.  Introduction
Despite two decades of extensive deregulation, banks in the United States remain among
the most heavily regulated entities in the U.S. economy.  This continued heavy regulation is surely
due to a mixture of causes:  Partly, banks remain a prominent target for American populism and its
political manifestations;1 but also important is the general recognition that one specific category of
bank regulation -- safety-and-soundness (prudential) regulation -- is a crucial element in preserving
the stability of the banking system and contributing to the health of the U.S. economy.
This paper will expand on this theme and discuss the important lessons and insights that can
be gained from the experiences of the banking sector and of safety-and-soundness regulation during
the past two decades.  An important "instructor" for this learning has been the episodes of extensive
lapses of safety-and-soundness regulation during these decades, leading to the insolvencies of large
numbers of savings and loan (S&L) associations and banks in the 1980s and early 1990s.
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows: Section II will survey briefly the
various types of bank regulation that can be found in the U.S., so as to clarify our focus on safety-
and-soundness regulation.  Section III will then discuss the phenomenon of asymmetric
information, which lies at the heart of financial transactions, and its implications for the activities
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 For further discussion of this phenomenon, see White (1993) and Shull and White (1998).
2and role of banks.  Section IV will apply the asymmetric information paradigm to banks themselves
and thereby illuminate the role of safety-and-soundness regulation and the primary tools that are
employed.  Section V will discuss the lessons that have been learned from the experiences of the
1980s and 1990s.  And Section VI will provide a brief conclusion.
To establish a framework or "vocabulary" for the discussion of banks and bank regulation
that follows, Figure 1 offers a stylized version of a bank’s balance sheet.  Its assets are the loans that
it makes, since it expects to be paid back, with interest.  Its liabilities are the deposits that it has
accepted (which provide the funding for the loans), since it owes that amount (is liable) to the
depositors.  The arithmetic difference between the value of the loan assets and the value of the
deposit liabilities is the net worth of the bank -- its owners’ equity -- or, as the phrase is commonly
used in banks, its capital.  So long as the value of the bank’s assets exceeds the value of its liabilities
-- i.e., so long as its capital is positive -- the bank is solvent.
3II. Understanding Bank Regulation
At first glance, the web of regulation that surrounds banks2 in the U.S. (and in virtually all
other countries as well) seems to be an impenetrable mass of restrictions and requirements.  And, in
the U.S. especially, efforts to understand bank regulation are not aided by the separate but
overlapping jurisdictions of the federal government and the 50 states; by the presence of three
federal regulators (the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC],
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency [OCC] that have separate but overlapping
jurisdictions with respect to commercial banks; and by the existence of other categories of
depository institutions (S&Ls, savings banks, and credit unions) that have many of the functions of
banks (and are tending to take on more of them), that are sometimes described as "banks", and that
have their own separate panoply of regulatory institutions and laws and regulations.  The printed
laws and regulations that apply to commercial banks would occupy many linear feet on a legal
library book shelf; the addition of the laws and regulations that apply to the other depository
institutions would extend the length appreciably.
Nevertheless, there is a way of making sense out of this apparent jumble.3  To do so, we
will employ a general three-way classification scheme for regulatory interventions.
A.  A typology of regulation.
                                                
    
2
 Unless otherwise indicated, we will use the phrase "banks" to refer to depository institutions
generally.  In some instances, however, we will be referring specifically to "commercial banks",
which are the banks that are regulated by the three federal agencies mentioned in the text below and
which have an historical legacy of emphasizing commercial lending.
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 See White (1994).
41.  "Economic regulation".  This category of regulation broadly involves governmental
controls with respect to prices, profits, and/or conditions of entry and exit, including must-serve
obligations.4  With respect to banking, such regulation would apply to any limits on interest rates
that can be charged on loans or paid on deposits; limits on fees for other financial services; limits
on de novo entry and on the establishment of new branch locations by incumbents; limits on the
fields and activities into which banks can enter; and requirements that banks provide services to
specific industry sectors and/or specific geographic areas.
It is important to note that this is the category of regulation that has been most affected by
the wave of deregulation that has occurred in a number of sectors in the U.S. economy, including
banking, over the past 20 years.  Indeed, a "snapshot" of the banking sector 20 years ago would
have revealed a much more extensive pattern of federal and state regulation -- controls on deposit
rates, de novo entry restrictions, branching restrictions, etc. -- than exist today.  Nevertheless, some
important features of economic regulation remain: e.g., the federal ban on the payment of interest
on commercial checking account deposits, some states’ restrictions on credit card fees, a few states’
restrictions on branching, the federal restrictions on the entry of banks into areas outside of
traditional commercial banking (including the areas of investment banking, insurance, and non-
financial areas generally);5 the federal requirement that banks "meet the needs" of their local
communities, etc.
2.  "Information regulation".  This form of regulation involves the requirements that specific
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 Outside of banking, such regulation was typified by the blanket control over airline fares,
routes, and entry and exit that the former Civil Aeronautics Board exercised prior to the late 1970s.
 It is still found in the area of local electricity, telephone, water, and gas rates, local taxicab
regulation in many ares, etc.
    
5
 This limitation is reciprocal, so enterprises in these other areas cannot own and operate banks.
5types of information, often in a standardized format, that must be provided with the product or
service.6  In banking, the requirements that banks provide standardized information on deposit rates
and loan rates to their customers are major examples of this form of regulation.
3.  "Health-safety-environment (HSE) regulation".7  This category of regulation broadly
encompasses restrictions on the types of products that a firm can offer and the types of production
processes in which it can engage.8  For banks, "safety-and-soundness" regulation is aimed primarily
at preventing the insolvency of banks.  The instruments of safety-and-soundness regulation are
primarily minimum capital (net worth) requirements (so as to provide a financial buffer against
potential insolvency), limitations on banks’ activities (so as to limit the riskiness of the activities of
banks), and the monitoring of the honesty and competency of banks’ managements and operations
(so as to avoid the insolvencies that might follow from dishonest or incompetent management). 
Safety-and-soundness regulation is sometimes described as a process of "examination and
supervision," since it is enforced through a field force of "examiners" and "supervisors".
As was mentioned in the introductory Section, safety-and-soundness regulation will be the
primary form of regulation that is discussed in this paper.
B.  Uses of the typology.
This three-way typology of regulation does not eliminate all ambiguities.  Activities
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 Outside of banking, the labels that accompany pharmaceuticals, the labels on packaged foods,
and the disclosure-of-information requirements for publicly traded companies are typical examples.
    
7
 This is sometimes described as "social regulation."
    
8
 Outside of banking, this form of regulation is manifested in aviation safety requirements,
environmental regulations, workplace safety requirements, pharmaceutical safety requirements, etc.
6limitations on banks might be considered to be a barrier to entry (economic regulation) or a risk-
restraining effort (safety-and-soundness regulation).  The preparation of bank balance sheets
according to a standardized accounting framework ("generally accepted accounting principles", or
GAAP) aids examiners and supervisors and helps define capital (safety-and-soundness regulation),
but it is also useful for any investor or depositor who is interested in the financial condition of
his/her bank (information regulation).
Despite these ambiguities, however, this classification scheme is broadly useful for linking
the types of regulatory actions with the likely motives for regulation.  In principle, economic
regulation could be used for restraining the exercise of market power, information regulation could
be used for dealing with problems of informational deficiencies, and H-S-E regulation could be
used for dealing with problems of negative externalities (spillover effects) as well as severe
problems of informational deficiencies (where the required provision of the information alone
might not be sufficient to deal with the problem).  In practice, of course, political forces come into
play, and parties that are affected by regulation often try to influence outcomes in their favor, so that
(for example) much economic regulation has come to represent efforts to protect incumbents and
thus exacerbate problems of market power rather than alleviating them.9  Nevertheless, the ability
to link types and motives of regulation helps clarify the role of regulation.
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 Indeed, it was the political recognition that, in many instances, this type of regulation was
impeding competition that contributed to the wave of deregulation of the 1970s and 1980s.
7III.  The Asymmetric Information Paradigm and Its Implications
for the Patterns of Finance
In order to understand the role and importance of safety-and-soundness regulation for
banks, a brief discussion of the basic processes and problems of finance generally and of banks
specifically is worthwhile.
A.  The Inherent Asymmetric Information Problem of Finance.
Financial transactions are different from most other economic transactions, in that financial
transactions have an unavoidable time sequencing structure:  They involve an initial transfer from a
lender to borrower (or from an investor to the recipient of invested funds10) and then a later
repayment.
Because of this time sequencing, the lender has to be concerned about being repaid.  But
information asymmetries between the borrower and the lender will adversely affect the lender’s
ability to determine the prospects of repayment.  First, before the lender grants the loan, the
borrower is likely to know more about its own risk characteristics and prospects for repayment than
does the lender, which can create the problems of adverse selection:  If there are no sanctions (or
weak sanctions) for non-repayment, risky borrowers are likely to be more eager to borrow (and to
be more willing to pay higher interest rates to borrow) than are less risky borrowers.11  Second, after
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 For terminological ease we will continue to describe such transactions as "loans", but the basic
concepts apply with equal force to equity investment arrangements.  They also apply to insurance
arrangements, where the insurer’s initial promise to provide insurance coverage to an insured then
creates the same types of problems.  And these problems arise, for the same inherent reasons, in
rental and lease markets.
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 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
8the borrower has received the funds, moral hazard problems arise:  In the absence of sanctions for
non-repayment, the borrower’s behavior will become more risk-prone, since the borrower will
receive all of the "upside" benefits from undertaking greater risks but will not bear the "downside"
costs.
Lenders’ recognition of these potential problems in turn causes the lenders to become
information gatherers:12  Before the granting of a loan, lenders will want to gather information
about the prospective borrowers’ likelihoods of repayment; and during the term of the loan the
borrower will continue to monitor the borrower’s behavior and financial condition, so as to be
reassured that the borrower’s likelihood of repayment has not diminished.
B.  Implications for the Structure of Finance.
Differing characteristics among prospective borrowers and differing information-gathering
skills among prospective lenders have logical consequences for the structure of finance.  These
implications are portrayed in Figures 2 and 3.
In Figure 2 we array potential borrowers along a spectrum of their informational opaqueness
or transparency.13  At the left-hand side of Figure 2, the most opaque potential borrowers will have
the most difficulties in arranging for finance and will (at best) have to rely on "friends and family"
and other informal sources for their finance.  Such informal sources are likely to have special
information about the borrowers’ abilities to repay and/or to have special means of extracting
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 Even if there are no inherent informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders but
there are differences among prospective borrowers with respect to their abilities/proclivities to
repay, the lenders will have the same incentives to gather information about the borrowers.
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 See Berger and Udell (1993).
9repayment (or to be more willing to forgo repayment).  At the right-hand side of Figure 2, the most
transparent borrowers will have the most ease in obtaining loans and will be able to access the
securities markets, where the lenders (bond buyers/investors) are the least able to scrutinize
borrowers beforehand or to monitor borrowers during the term of the loan.
Borrowers of intermediate opaqueness/transparency are likely to rely on lenders that are
information specialists -- lenders with special information gathering expertise and monitoring
capabilities -- for their finance.  These specialists include financial intermediaries (such as banks
and other depository institutions, commercial and consumer finance companies, insurance
companies, and mutual funds or investment trusts), supplier firms (providing short-term trade
credit), and the special finance subsidiaries of equipment suppliers (providing, in essence, longer-
term trade credit).  Further, the structure of the lending/borrowing arrangement will be sensitive to
the opaqueness of the borrower:  More opaque borrowers are likely to receive shorter (and/or more
callable) loans on which they pay higher interest rates and for which they are more likely to be
asked to post collateral.14
The boundaries that separate the types of borrowers (and where they get their finance) are
not rigid and will be affected by prevailing legal arrangements, by the transparency of accounting
conventions, and by the current state of data gathering and processing technologies.  To the extent
that lenders have greater legal reassurance that they will be repaid (e.g., greater ability to seize
collateral and repossess assets and greater certainty about priorities in bankruptcy arrangements),
they will be more willing to lend to borrowers that would be otherwise too opaque.15  Further,
                                                
    
14
 See Strahan (1999).
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 See Laporta et al. (1997, 1998) and  Levine (1998, 1999).
10
greater transparency in accounting (on the part of enterprises) will make the lender’s task of
determining the riskiness of the borrower easier, while opaque accounting will make these
determinations more difficult and will likely cause the lender to "fear the worst", thereby
discouraging lending; uniformity of accounting treatment across enterprises will make comparisons
easier.
Improvements in the technologies of data collection and assessment make the lenders’
information gathering and monitoring tasks easier and tend to push to the left the boundaries
portrayed in Figure 2.  Thus, as the technologies of telecommunications and data processing have
improved dramatically in the past few decades in the U.S., more types of borrowings have tended to
be "securitized" and thus the securities markets have encompassed more borrowers (e.g., junk
bonds, mortgage-backed securities, other types of asset-backed securities), while banks and other
intermediaries have been able to penetrate more deeply into the area of opaque borrowers, making
credit card loans to households and small enterprises and even making more small business loans
that were previously considered too risky.
Accordingly, in Figure 2 we portray the boundaries between the various types of borrowers
and their prospective lenders with a wavy line, which is meant to convey the concept of fuzzy
boundaries that vary according to the legal, accounting, and technological conditions that are
present.
In Figure 3 we provide two important characteristics of informational
opaqueness/transparency for enterprise borrowers -- their size and their age -- and show how
borrowers with these characteristics will tend to be matched with the various types of lenders. 
Young firms tend to be opaque; they have a limited "track record" from which lenders can make
11
judgments.  Small firms require small amounts of financing, which would not justify the fixed-cost
expenses of information gathering and assessment that a specialized lender would require. 
Accordingly, very young, small enterprises are likely to have to rely on "friends and family" and
informal finance.  As firms grow older and larger, they may be able to obtain trade credit and to
attract the attention of banks or other financial intermediaries.  Finally, when they are sufficiently
large and mature, they can directly access the securities markets.  Again, in Figure 3 we have drawn
the boundaries as wavy (fuzzy) lines, since these boundaries will depend on legal, accounting, and
technological arrangements.
This asymmetric-information based approach to the structure of finance thus indicates that
there is an important role for banks and bank-like entities, which act as information specialist
lenders vis-a-vis borrowers that are in the intermediate range of informational
opacity/transparency.16  Small and medium-size enterprises with modest "track records" are clearly
in this intermediate category.  Banks have historically held this role of lender to borrowers in the
intermediate category, since banks’ relative sizes have given them advantages of expertise, scale,
and diversification in dealing with borrowers, which individual lenders would be unlikely to have. 
In addition, since borrowers (especially enterprise borrowers) are likely also to maintain their
checking accounts with the lending bank, that bank may be able to use this information so as to be
able to monitor its borrowers more effectively.17
                                                
    
16
 See also Gorton and Winton (1998).
    
17
 See Nakamura (1993).
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IV.  Asymmetric Information and The Role of Safety-and-Soundness Regulation
As Section III indicated, banks and bank-like intermediaries are likely to play an important
role in providing finance in an economy, especially for small and medium-size enterprises.18 
Historically this has indeed been true in the U.S.; and, despite a substantial decline over time in the
relative role of banks within the financial sector,19 banks remain a sizable and important source of
finance in the U.S. economy.  Table 1 provides a few of the salient characteristics of U.S.
commercial banks, as of June 30, 1999.
Relative importance alone, however, would not justify a role for safety-and-soundness
regulation.  Instead, we must look to the special nature of banks.
A.  The potential for moral hazard behavior.
The financial structure of a typical bank makes it prone to the same type of moral hazard
behavior problems that were described in Section III when we discussed the problems of lenders in
general.  To illustrate this point, in Figure 4A we reproduce the bank balance sheet of Figure 1.  In
the discussion that follows it is crucial to remember that the bank’s depositors, as its liability
holders, are in the position of lenders to the bank.
If the bank experiences losses and the value of its assets declines to, say, $80 (because some
borrowers cannot repay their loans), the bank has become insolvent, as is portrayed in Figure 4B. 
The bank’s owners’ stake has been eliminated, and, under a legal system of limited liability for
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 For international evidence that banks are important for economic growth and development, see
Levine (1998) and Levine and Zervos (1998).
    
19
 See Litan (1987), Edwards (1996), and Kroszner (1996).
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owners, they cannot be held liable for any losses beyond the elimination of their equity.  Thus, the
only other absorbers of the insufficient value of the assets must be the depositors.  In the absence of
any other arrangement, the bank of Figure 4B would have to close, its assets would be liquidated
(for their $80 value), and the depositors would somehow allocate the $80 among themselves to
satisfy their $92 in claims.20
The limited liability arrangement thus creates moral hazard behavior incentives for bank
owners (or bank managers on the owners’ behalf) to engage in excessively risky lending.21  The
bank owners will capture the benefits from the "upside" outcomes of risky ventures; but their losses
from the "downside" outcomes are limited to their equity stake.  Such excessively risky lending will
have negative expected values and thus imply inefficient investments.
If depositors were information specialists who could readily assess the riskiness of their
bank’s activities, they could monitor their bank’s activities and protect themselves (in the same way
that the bank protects itself in its role as lender).  But, for the most part, depositors are not
information specialists and are unlikely to be able to protect themselves adequately as lenders to
banks.  Thus, the potential for moral hazard behavior by banks is ever-present.
B.  The role of safety-and-soundness regulation.
In the light of the previous discussion, the safety-and-soundness regulation of banks ought
to be seen as the public sector equivalent (on behalf of depositors) of the restrictions that banks,
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 If, instead, an acquiror were considering taking over the insolvent bank, it would insist that the
depositors relinquish $12 of their claims, so as to bring the liabilities into equality with the
(diminished) level of assets.
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 This problem of moral hazard arising from limited liability is, of course, a general one and
applies to all corporations vis-a-vis their creditors; it underlay much of the discussion on Section III.
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bond holders, and other lenders impose (in the form of lending agreements and covenants) on a
borrowing enterprise, so as to reassure themselves of repayment.22  As was noted in Section II, the
primary tools of safety-and-soundness regulation are activities restrictions, so as to prevent the bank
from engaging in excessively risky activities (the "downside" of which could cause insolvencies);
general monitoring of the honesty and competency of the bank’s management and operations, so as
to avoid insolvencies due to incompetence; and minimum capital requirements, so as to maintain a
financial buffer against insolvency.
This terse overview does not do nearly enough justice to the myriad complexities of the
day-to-day processes of safety-and-soundness regulation.  Nevertheless, the basic logic and
rationale for these efforts can be seen in terms of the bank balance sheets of Figures 4A and 4B. 
The downside losses from excessively risky activities could reduce the value of the bank’s assets
sufficiently so as to cause insolvency.  Dishonest or incompetent management could similarly
diminish the value of the assets, deliberately (e.g., by "taking the money and running") or
inadvertently, so as to cause insolvency.  The insistence on the maintenance of a minimum level of
capital, with tighter restrictions and closer monitoring if the bank’s capital falls below the minimum
level, provides a financial buffer against accidental or unexpected declines in asset values and
consequent insolvency.  Further, a required minimum level of capital provides an important indirect
benefit:  The larger is the owners’ equity stake in the bank, the greater is the loss that they will incur
from the downside of risk-taking (before their limited liability protections become applicable) and
thus the less inclined they will be to take risks in the first place.
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 A similar logic would apply to the safety regulatory protections that are provided to the insured
parties of insurance companies and the pension claimants of defined benefit pension plans; and it is
no accident that the claimants of these financial entities are provided with governmental guarantees
that are similar in nature to the deposit insurance that applies to banks.
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These efforts do not always work perfectly.  Indeed, the wave of S&L and bank insolvencies
in the U.S. in the 1980s and early 1990s were a clear indication of the imperfections of past safety-
and-soundness regulation, as will be discussed in Section V.  But monitoring by private-sector
lenders of their borrowers’ activities is not always perfect either; borrower bankruptcies do occur. 
The logic of these monitoring efforts, however, is clear for both the private and public sectors.
Since 1933 the federal government has supplemented safety-and-soundness regulation with
explicit deposit insurance, as an extra protection for depositors (against a failure of safety-
soundness-regulation to protect them adequately).23  With the presence of deposit insurance (and
with the deposit insurance agency bearing the losses of bank insolvencies), safety-and-soundness
regulation can also be interpreted as the public-sector equivalent of the rules and procedures that
insurance companies use to protect themselves against losses.  The logic of the tools remains the
same.
C.  The unstable structure of banks.
The problems of bank insolvency discussed above are exacerbated by the maturity and
liquidity mis-match of the typical bank’s assets and liabilities.  The bank’s loan assets tend to be of
longer maturity and less liquid than its deposit liabilities, most of which can be withdrawn at
relatively short notice.  No bank can meet the simultaneous demand of all of its depositors for their
funds.
                                                
    
23
 Federal deposit insurance, through the establishment of the FDIC, was first authorized for
commercial banks and savings banks in 1933; in 1934 it was extended to depositors in S&Ls,
through the establishment of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) (which
was dissolved in 1989, with the FDIC as its successor); and in 1970 it was extended to depositors in
credit unions, through the establishment of the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).
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This mis-match thus creates the potential for depositor runs, which can force the closure of
even solvent banks.24  If depositors fear -- correctly or incorrectly -- that their bank’s assets have
declined substantially in value, they will rush to the bank to withdraw their funds, so as to avoid
bearing some of the losses of the feared insolvency.  Even if their fears are baseless, the
withdrawals by enough poorly informed depositors could cause the bank to be unable to honor its
liquidity commitments to those depositors.  As a consequence, even well-informed depositors who
know that the bank’s assets have not lost value will also rush to withdraw their deposits, in fear that
the former group’s withdrawals may impede the latter’s access to their funds.  Their rush to the bank
will exacerbate the bank’s liquidity problems.  And if its inability to meet its depositors’ withdrawal
requests causes the bank to close and liquidate its assets -- i.e., call in its loans -- then even an
originally solvent bank may become insolvent as its loans cannot be repaid in full on short notice.
Further, if poorly informed depositors in neighboring banks fear that similar problems could
affect their banks, and depositor runs could be contagious.  Alternatively, a run on one bank might
impair the claims of other banks, creating a cascade of failed banks.
In principle, a lender of last resort -- the Federal Reserve, as central banker -- could provide
sufficient short-term liquidity lending to solvent banks to allow them to withstand runs.  But the
lender of last resort would require information as to which banks were truly solvent and would have
all of the concerns of a lender with respect to its loans to the banks, which means the virtual
recreation of a safety-and-soundness regulatory system.
In sum, because of the structural characteristics of banks and because depositors are likely
to be poorly informed as to the solvency of their banks, safety-and-soundness regulation continues
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17
to be an essential feature of the U.S. banking system.
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V.  The Experience of the 1980s and the Early 1990s, and the Lessons
After the financial trauma of the 1929-1933 period, when many thousands of banks and
other depository institutions failed,25 the federal government imposed substantially tighter
regulatory controls on banks and other depository institutions.  Partly these involved "economic
regulation" measures, such as controls on entry, restrictions on interest rates paid on deposits, and
restrictions on entry into other fields (such as investment banking); and partly they involved tighter
safety-and-soundness regulatory measures.  Also, federal deposit insurance was offered for the first
time.  And new governmental agencies were created.
The combination of these measures, plus the stabilization of the U.S. economy by the mid
1930s, ended the trauma for banks and their depositors.  The subsequent growth of the U.S.
economy during the Second World War and the three decades following the war meant stable and
prosperous banking markets.  Table 2 provides the decade totals of bank failures.  As compared
with what would follow in the 1980s and early 1990s, the earlier decades were clearly a period of
calmness.  A similar picture would describe the S&L industry.
The 1980s, however, did bring a different experience.  The S&L experience, which we will
describe first, attracted the greatest public attention --for good reason.  But the bank experience,
which we will next describe, was also important, since it reinforced many of the lessons of the S&L
debacle.  This Section will conclude with those lessons.
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were thousands more failures of S&Ls and savings banks.
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The S&L experience.26
Despite four decades of growth and prosperity, the S&L industry entered the 1980s in a
weak position.  The industry had been constrained to be a lender for residential real estate
mortgages, and to make fixed-rate, long-term mortgage loans.  Simultaneously, S&Ls funded
themselves by taking in mostly short-term deposits.  This position -- "borrowing short and lending
long" - meant that they were vulnerable to general increases in the levels of interest rates.  When a
sustained period of higher interest rates began in 1979, S&Ls began to hemorrhage.
The Congress responded in 1980 and again in 1982 with legislation that reversed the pattern
of economic regulation that had previously constrained the industry.  Many states followed, and
sometimes led, with deregulation measures of their own.  S&Ls were permitted to expand their
asset portfolios to include other kinds of loans and were permitted to make adjustable rate
mortgages.  Interest rate ceilings on deposits were removed, and the maximum insured amount was
increased to $100,000 (from $40,000, where it had been since 1974).
Though the deregulation measures were at least a decade too late in coming, they still
represented a worthwhile loosening of restraints.  But these measures needed to be accompanied by
strengthened safety-and-soundness regulation, because many S&Ls were in strained financial
positions -- with low capital levels -- which meant that they had great incentives for risk-taking.
Unfortunately, the opposite occurred.  Minimum capital levels were decreased; the
accounting framework that applied to S&Ls for regulatory purposes was modified, so as to allow
S&Ls artificially to report higher levels of capital; and the numbers of supervisors and examiners
was decreased.  Compounding this problem was a lulled sense of danger on the part of the
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personnel of the regulatory agency for S&Ls, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB).  Since
the S&L industry had caused few problems in the previous 45 years, this lulling was
understandable.  Nevertheless, it was unfortunate.
In this less constrained environment hundreds of S&Ls grew rapidly between 1983 and
1985, often making risky or ill-conceived loans in the newly opened categories.  The aggregate
amount was well over $100 billion.  This rapid growth would likely have yielded problems in any
event.  But the problems were compounded by three exogenous events:  First the price of petroleum
had risen sharply in 1973-74 and again in 1979; many individuals predicted that petroleum prices
would rise yet further.  Many of the new loans were in commercial real estate in the southwestern
part of the U.S. and were dependent on a high or rising price of petroleum.  But, after hitting a peak
in early 1981, petroleum prices drifted downward for the next five years and then fell sharply in
early 1986.  They recovered subsequently but have never regained their 1981 nominal levels.  With
the decline in petroleum prices went the fate of many of the new commercial real estate loans by
S&Ls and ultimately the fate of the S&Ls.
Second, the federal Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 had greatly enhanced the tax
advantages that attached to investing in commercial real estate.  Many S&Ls’ loans were predicated
on the tax-advantaged economics of the underlying projects.  But the Tax Reform Act of 1986
reversed course and removed the favorable position of real estate.  With this reversal went again a
reversal of fortune of many S&Ls’ real estate loans and then the S&Ls themselves.
Third, an idiosyncratic but unfortunate occurrence was the timing of the transfer of a
regulatory field office of the FHLBB from Little Rock to Dallas.  This office had responsibility for
S&Ls in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, and New Mexico.  The transfer took place in mid
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1983, and the office was substantially disrupted for over two years -- at just the time that rapid
growth in the Southwest was occurring.
In late 1984 the FHLBB began to reverse course and to tighten safety-and-soundness
regulatory standards and also greatly expanded its filed force of examiners and supervisors.  By the
end of 1986 the regulatory system was considerably tighter than it had been three years earlier.  But
the damage had been done.  The risky loans had already been made and were going sour.  The
recognition of the poor quality of the loans and the consequent insolvencies of hundreds of S&Ls
would take time -- partly because accounting practices are backward looking and are slow to
recognize changes in current values of assets, and partly because real estate markets in the
Southwest and elsewhere continued to crumble in the late 1980s.
The FHLBB struggled to deal with the debacle of hundreds of insolvent S&Ls but was
hampered by inadequate funds and inadequate political recognition of the depth of the problem.  In
1989 the Bush Administration and the Congress took the first steps to deal with the problem.  The
S&L’s deposit insurance fund, the FSLIC, was finally recognized to be insolvent itself; substantial
taxpayer funds would be required to cover the deposit insurance guarantees in the hundreds of
failed S&Ls.  Legislation provided a first tranche of funds for a cleanup, abolished the FHLBB and
the FSLIC, established new agencies for regulating S&Ls (the Office of Thrift Supervision [OTS])
and for cleaning up the "debris" of hundreds of insolvent S&Ls (the Resolution Trust Corporation
[RTC]), and transferred the deposit insurance coverage for S&Ls to the FDIC.  Legislation in
subsequent years finished the job.
In the end, over 1,200 S&Ls failed between 1980 and 1994.  Though the major damage was
done between 1983 and 1985, the delayed recognition of the problem and the delayed actions in
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cleaning it up surely added to the eventual costs, which totaled about $160 billion.27
B.  The commercial bank experience.28
Commercial banks too entered the 1980s after 45 years of relative calm and prosperity.  Not
having been as narrowly restricted in activities as S&Ls and especially not having been forced
exclusively to borrow short and lend long, banks were not seriously affected by the high interest
rate environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s and thus were not in the same financial straits as
were S&Ls.
Nevertheless, economic regulation -- especially branching limitations -- played a large role
in the structure of the industry and its vulnerability over the next decade.  As of the beginning of
1980 there were more than 14,000 banks in the U.S.; over half of them were small -- under $25
million (!) in assets.  Interstate branching was prohibited, and a number of states prohibited any
branching (unit banking states, such as Texas or Illinois) or greatly limited branching even within
their own state boundaries.  Effectively, there were large numbers of banks, many of them small, all
of them confined to locations within states and many confined to substantially smaller
communities.  Such limitations made them more vulnerable to local or regional fluctuations.
The strong encouragement for commercial real estate investment provided by the high and
rising price of petroleum in 1980 and by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 presented the
same temptations for loans by commercial banks as was true for their S&L brethren, especially
since 1982 legislation eased restrictions on banks’ abilities to make commercial real estate loans. 
                                                
    
27
 See FDIC (1997, ch. 4).
    
28
 See FDIC (1997).
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Many banks did expand into commercial real estate loans and then were hurt when the price of
petroleum declined, the Congress reversed course in the 1986 Tax Act, and commercial real estate
prices declined substantially, especially in the Southwest and then in the Northeast.  Further
compounding some banks’ woes, especially smaller rural banks in the Midwest, was the decline in
the prosperity of U.S. agriculture in the mid 1980s.  And regional recessions, the national recession
of 1990-1991, and the recession in California in the early 1990s exacerbated some banks’
problems.29
Also, as was true in the case of S&Ls, bank regulators were understaffed in the early 1980s
and had been lulled by the calmness of the previous decades.  They were too slow to react when
troubles did arise.  Also, there had been a tendency to replace some on-site examinations with off-
site monitoring, which meant that direct scrutiny of managers and managerial practices (and the
quality of the data that were used for off-site monitoring) occurred less frequently.
Over the period 1980-1994 more banks -- over 1,500 -- than S&Ls failed.  But on average
the failed banks were considerably smaller than their S&L counterparts, and the average seriousness
of their insolvencies was considerably less as well.  The eventual loss to the FDIC was less than
$40 billion -- less than a quarter of the size of the S&L debacle.  The FDIC insurance funds were
large enough to be able to absorb the losses, so that the FDIC did not fail they way that the FSLIC
failed, although in 1991 the expected losses of the FDIC looked sizable enough that there was
considerable worry that the fund might become insolvent and require taxpayer assistance.  The
rapidly improved fortunes of the banking sector, as well as the U.S. economy more generally,
                                                
    
29
 Large money center banks experienced problems in the mid 1980s because of failed loans to
less developed countries (LDCs).  But partial repayments and the stretching out of the losses
allowed the banks eventually to absorb the losses without failing themselves.
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rapidly dispelled the fears.
C.  The lessons
Over the past two decades the U.S. has gone through two major waves of insolvencies: by
S&Ls and by banks.  The timing and some of the causes of the two waves were similar.  When this
experience is seen through the filter of the discussion in the previous Sections, there are important
lessons that can be learned.
1.  Economic regulation that limited S&Ls’ and banks’ operating flexibility tended to make
them more vulnerable to changes in their environments and thus more prone to insolvencies. 
Efforts to cosset and protect have, paradoxically, made these depository institutions less safe.
2. Safety-and-soundness regulation has a valuable role to play in limiting moral hazard
behavior and thus preserving the stability of banks.  The details of the regulation and its
implementation are important in determining its efficacy.  Deposit insurance plays a useful
supplementary role in reassuring depositors against regulatory failures.30
3. Minimum capital requirements that are sensitive to the risks undertaken by a bank and
that are forward looking are essential as a buffer and as a deterrent to excessive risk-taking.
As banks slip below the minimum levels, they should be subject to heightened levels of scrutiny
and tighter restrictions on actions.  When they reach insolvency, the owners (whose net worth is
now zero) should be removed, as should senior managers who were responsible for the deteriorated
financial position of the bank.  Prompt action is essential for maintaining a system of incentives and
disincentives as well as for limiting any regulatory evasions that might occur by desperate
                                                
    
30
 Deposit insurance may lull depositor scrutiny of banks.  But most depositors are not
information specialists and are unlikely to be able effectively to monitor their banks.
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owners/managers.  Either new owners for the bank should be found (with the government deposit
insurance fund "filling the hole" of the insolvency), or the bank should be liquidated and the
depositors paid off.  A temporary "holding pen" for an insolvent bank under government auspices
may be unavoidable, while the best course of action is considered.  But rapid disposal is usually the
cost-minimizing strategy, since the managers of a "holding pen" bank rarely have the proper
incentives to maximize value.31  Rapid action -- in spotting problems, imposing restrictions, and
disposing of an insolvent back -- are generally the means of minimizing the costs of insolvencies.
4. An accounting framework that reflects current values of assets and liabilities is essential
for the proper calculation of capital and for taking prompt corrective action as a bank slips below its
minimum level.  The existing accounting framework (GAAP) is not adequate for these purposes,
because it is fundamentally backward looking, emphasizing historical values rather than focusing
on current values.  During the episodes of the 1980s, S&L regulators and bank regulators were
often inhibited from imposing restrictive measures sooner on individual institutions because the
backward-looking GAAP framework was not registering the current deteriorated conditions that the
regulators were recognizing.  For bank regulatory purposes, GAAP must be replaced by a current
(market) value framework.
5. Regulatory determination of the competency of bank managers and practices are an
important part of safety-and-soundness regulation.  On-site visits are integral to that process.
6. Activities limitations have a proper role, but in a structured way.  The key determination
is whether an activity is "examinable and supervisable" -- i.e., whether examiners and supervisors
can assess an activity, know when it is competently managed, and determine appropriate capital
                                                
    
31
 This is also true for the assets that the government acquires through the liquidation of failed
banks.  See FDIC (1998).
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requirements.  If they can, then there should be few problems in permitting the activity within the
bank.  If they cannot, then the activity should be forbidden to the bank but should be permitted
either as a separately capitalized subsidiary of the bank32 or of the bank’s holding company --
preferably the former.33
7. Safety-and-soundness regulation must be enforced by a cadre of adequately staffed, paid,
and trained examiners and supervisors.
                                                
    
32
 I.e., the bank should not be able to count as an asset the net worth of the subsidiary.
    
33
 See  White (1996) and Shull and White (1998).
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VI.  Conclusion
Finance is not easy; neither is financial regulation, especially safety-and-soundness
regulation.  But there are substantial gains to doing it well; and equally serious losses can occur
from doing it poorly.  Since 1990 a number of countries -- including Japan, France, Sweden, Spain,
Mexico, Thailand, Korea, Venezuela, Indonesia -- have experienced serious and costly insolvencies
among their banks.
Starting a decade earlier, during the 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. went through two
waves of insolvencies: by savings and loan institutions (S&Ls) and by banks.  The former wave
was especially costly and painful, though the latter wave too generated costs in the tens of billions
of dollars and resulted in the failure of over 1,500 banks.  The lessons of these experiences have
been available.  Absorbing these lessons might have reduced the costs of the experiences of these
other countries.  It is a pity that political learning is often so slow.
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Table 1: Salient Features of U.S. Commercial Banks
(as of June 30, 1999)
Total Banks > $10B
   Industry  in Assets
Number of banks   8,675 77
Total assets ($B) $5,468  $3,612
Commercial & industrial loans ($B)   $936    $710
Deposits ($B) $3,681  $2,271
Capital/assets (%)   8.53%    7.94%
Source: FDIC
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Table 2: Bank Failures and Deposit Insurance Losses*
1940-1988
Number of    Deposit Insurance
  Bank Failures      Losses ($M)
Decade totals:
1940-1949    99      $6
1950-1959    28  3
1960-1969    43  8
1970-1979    76     117
1980-1989 1,086  22,961
1990-1999+     509  13,769
Individual years:
1980    11     $31
1981    10     782
1982    42   1,169
1983    48   1,407
1984    80   1,640
1985   120   1,007
1986   145   1,776
1987   203   2,024
1988   280   6,924
1989   207   6,201
1990   169   2,773
1991   127   6,189
1992   122   3,666
1993    41     645
1994    13     182
1995     6 87
1996     5 40
1997     1  4
1998     3     179
1999+        2    n.a.
Source: FDIC
                                                
     
*
 Includes mutual savings banks.
     
+
 Through June 1999.
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FIGURE 1: STYLIZED BALANCE SHEET OF
A HEALTHY BANK
     Assets      Liabilities
   $100 (loans)     $92 (deposits)
                                           --------------------
                                   $8 (net worth, owners’
                                         equity, capital)
1FIGURE 2: THE SPECTRUM OF INFORMATIONAL OPAQUENESS/TRANSPARENCY
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1FIGURE 3: TWO DETERMINANTS OF OPAQUENESS/TRANSPARENCY
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1FIGURE 4A: STYLIZED BALANCE SHEET OF
A HEALTHY BANK
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FIGURE 4B: STYLIZED BALANCE SHEET OF
A DEEPLY INSOLVENT BANK
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                                    -$12 (net worth, owners’
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